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CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES
ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGo (DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO V. UGANDA): REVIEWING

THE CONCEPT OF OCCUPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
HnMAMTARiAN LAw
Chandralekha Ghosh*
This note examines dicta of the InternationalCourt of Justice in the
recent case of DRC v. Uganda, in so far as it relates to the concept of
occupation in internationalhumanitarianlaw. The question of when
a territory is said to be under occupation is crucially important in
order to determine the rights and obligations of various parties to
the dispute. This was the first occasion that the ICJ clarified the
concept of occupation, and this note discusses both the majority
judgment, and the strong separateand dissenting opinions rendered
in this case. It also seeks to discuss the merits of each approach and
applies the same in the context of the Israeli-Palestinedispute.
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I.

THE CONCEPT OF OCCUPATION

A. The Need for a Legal Definition
In the common sense of the term, and as the International Committee of
the Red Cross views it, a territory is considered "occupied" when it is actually
placed under the authority of foreign armed forces, whether partially or entirely,
without the consent of the domestic government.' This concept is important in
international humanitarian law (IHL) as rules of the latter apply in all situations
where conditions of occupation are fulfilled,2 regardless of the motives leading to
such occupation or the legality of the occupation in internatiohal lawA
A comprehensive legal understanding of the concept of occupation and its
prerequisites becomes important since there are manifold reasons why the State
whose armed forces are present on another's territory would seek to deny the fact
of occupation. First and foremost, occupation has concomitant obligations, under
international humanitarian law, which the occupier may wish to avoid. A situation
of occupation confers both rights and obligations on the occupying power which
must be observed in occupied territory as enshrined in the Hague Regulations of
1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and certain provisions of the First
Protocol of 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.4 Secondly, the
status of occupation can legally justify violence as armed struggle in support of

2

3

References to Key Legal Provisions Regardingthe Occupation of Territoryby a Hostile
Power, and the Implicationsfor People Protectedby InternationalHumanitarian
Law,
available at http://www.ierc.org/Web/Eng/siteengo.nsf/htmlall
section ihl occupied_territory (last visited 30th April 2007).
Common Article 2, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
The legality is a question of jus ad bellum, which deals with whether the war was

initiated on legally justifiable grounds, while humanitarian law deals only with
jus in bello, or the body of law applicable in times of armed conflict which protects

4

those not or no longer taking a direct part in hostilities and which regulates
permissible means and methods of warfare.
Some of the most important rules of IHL governing occupation state that the
occupying power does not gain sovereignty over the occupied territory and cannot
annex it; it is a temporary situation and the rights of the occupying power are

limited to such period; and the occupying power must respect the laws in force in
the territory, unless they constitute a security threat or an obstacle to the
application of the IHL. The occupying power must take measures to restore and
maintain, as far as possible, public order and safety, and ensure sufficient hygiene
and public health standards, and the provision of food and medical care to the
population under occupation. The population in occupied territory cannot be forced
to enlist in the occupier's armed forces or furnish information about army and
means of defence. Collective punishment, taking of hostages, reprisals against
109
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self-determination against alien occupation.5 The absence of this status would
mean that the violence is equivalent to terrorism and therefore, illegal under
international law. Thirdly, as expressed by Israel, acknowledging occupation
implies abandoning any claims on the territory, as laws of war do not permit
annexation of occupied territory, and the occupier then gets cast in the role of a
foreigner with no links to it? Morevoer, there is a certain political stigma attached
to the role of a belligerent occupier. Fourthly, withdrawal of troops by the
occupying power may not mean that control is no longer being exercised over
the territory8 - the devolution of governmental authority may have only been to
puppet governments. 9 Also, presence of occupying troops where governmental
authority has been effectively delegated will not amount to occupation a This
implies that the definition of occupation must necessarily accommodate such
possibilities as well.
In light of these reasons, a clear and definite legal definition of the concept
in international humanitarian law is essential. The International Court undertook

6

protected persons and property, confiscation of private property, pillage or the
destruction of enemy property (unless absolutely required by military necessity
during conduct of hostilities) is prohibited. These are embodied in Convention (IV)
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulation
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(ser. 3) 461, 187 Consol T.S. 227, entered into force Jan. 26, 191o [hereinafter
Convention IV}].
Though this right to resistance, orjus insurrectionis, is a controversial one denied
by some, it is now generally admitted that the duty of obedience to an established
and effective occupier ceases where the occupier himself has committed substantial
violations of international law. 1. DETTER, THE LAw OF WAR 181 (200o).
The Palestinians claim that intifada or armed struggle is seeking self-determination
against the belligerent occupation of territories by Israel but Israel decries the

repeated references to 'occupation' in the international community in relation to
those territories as encouraging and legitimising terrorist activities. D. Gold, From
"Occupied Territories" to "Disputed Territories", available at http://wwwjcpa.org/
jl/vp470.htm (last visited 3oth April 2007) [hereinafter Gold].

Gold, supra note 8. See also: Official Statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel,
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il&sitesearch=http%3A%2FF%2F www.mfa.gov.il
(last visited 3oth April 2007).

The War in Iraq and InternationalHumanitarian Law, availableat http://www.hrw.org/
campaigns/iraq/ihlfaqoccupationcited.pdf (last visited 3oth April 2007).
D. Thurer, Current Challenges to the Law of Occupation, available at http://
www.icre.org (last visited 30th April 2007) [hereinafter Thurer].
0 Historical examples where an occupation was declared or widely presumed to have
ended despite the continued presence of the occupier's forces are Japan (1952),
West Germany (1955) and East Germany (19541. Here this happened as the treaties
ending occupation were accompanied by others permitting the presence of foreign

forces. Thurer, supra note g.
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the task of clarifying this concept as part of a judgment delivered on 19 December
2005, on Uganda's invasion of Congo? Although a number of issues were dealt
with in this case, this note is only concerned with the part of the judgment relating
to the alleged 'occupation'. This was the first time the Court has attempted to
define the concept of occupation. Hence apart from the implications on the case
at hand, this dicta is bound to have significant impact on any future controversies
on the issue. This note will attempt to examine the facts of the cases and the
differing approaches as seen in the majority judgment, which subscribed to a
narrow view of the term, and the very strong separate opinion delivered by Judge
Koojimans. The practical ramifications of the different approaches have been
analysed with the help of the example of Israel and the Gaza Strip.

II.

THE VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:

CASE CONCERNING ARMED AcTIVIIES ON THE TERRITORY
OF THE CONGO
A. Background to the Case
The proceedings were filed in 1999 by the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) against the Republic of Uganda seeking relief and reparations for acts of
armed aggression in their territory attributable to the latter. With specific regard
to the issue of belligerent occupation, DRC contended that large areas of Congolese
territory had fallen into Ugandan occupation during 1998, and the Uganda Peoples'
Defence Force (UPDF) administered such occupation zone both directly as well as
indirectly. The creation of a new province of Kibal-Ituri by the UPDF was cited as
an instance to support the claim that Ugandan authorities were directly controlling
the administration in such areas. Colonel Muzoora of the UPDF was alleged to
have exercised de facto powers of a governor in that province.
Uganda disputed these claims by indicating that the numbers of its troops
were too less to occupy the vast areas as claimed by the DRC, as they had less than
10,000 soldiers at the height of deployment. More importantly, Uganda claimed
that its troops were confined to strategic locations such as airfields in order to
decrease vulnerability to attacks by the DRC. Further, admitting the appointment
of a governor in the province, Uganda emphasized that the step was a necessary
interference in local administration keeping in mind the interests of the population
Case ConcerningArmed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Uganda),InternationalCourt ofJustice, i9 December 2oo5, availableat

http://www.icj-cij-org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icojudgments /icojudgment_2005
1219.pdf (last visited 30th April 2007) [hereinafter DRC v. Uganda].
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and the sole instance of any authority being exercised by Uganda on Congolese
territory. To bolster this argument, Uganda indicated that the officer responsible
for this appointment had disciplinary measures instituted against him by his
superiors.
In order to determine whether there was belligerent occupation, the facts
had to examined by the International Court of Justice in light of the existing law
on the subject which requires that the occupied territory be under "actual
authority" of the occupying forces.12 Unfortunately, the concept of "actual
authority" itself has been the subject of continuous debate with two distinct
approaches to the notion. Therefore, it was necessary for the International Court
of Justice to elect one over the other.
B. 'Actual Authority': A Precondition for Occupation
Article

42

of the Hague Regulations, 1907 states: "Territory is considered

occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised [emphasis added]."3 Common Article 2(2) of
the Geneva Conventions adds that the Conventions apply to all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the occupation
meets with no armed resistance. The relevant criteria distilled from the above
would be that there must be an exercise of authority or effective control, over the
whole or part of the territoryof another state, whether or not there was armed
resistance. Now one must turn to the question of what 'actual authority' entails.
One interpretation of the element of exercise of authority is that the situation
of occupation begins whenever a party to a conflict is exercising some level of
control over enemy territory. This would cover advancing troops even during
the invasion phase of hostilities.4 The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) prefers to maximise protection of persons by considering that rules of IHL
apply as soon as persons in the territory come under the control of the hostile
forces when the scope of 'actual authority' is liberally interpreted.15
The narrower approach maintains that occupation begins once the party is
in a position to exercise the level of authority over the territory required to
12
13
14

'5

Article 42, Convention (IV), supra note 4.
Convention (IV), supra note 4.
This approach was suggested by Jean Pictet in the 1958 Commentaries to the
Geneva Conventions. Thurer, supra note 9.
Thurer, supra note 9.
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enable it to discharge all the obligations imposed by the law of occupation. 6 This
is the approach adopted by the military manuals of most States, for instance, the
British Military Manual that the occupying power must be in a position to
substitute its authority for that of the government of the territory.7
Schwarzenberger also opines, "Effective occupation manifests itself by the
establishment of adequate State machinery and the actual display of State
jurisdiction" with the degree of effectiveness depending upon factors such as size
of territory, extent of habitation and climatic conditions.'8 Here, IHL would not
apply during invasion phases. Some look upon "invasion" as when enemy armed
forces stay or fight on the territory without having established the authority
necessary for it to be a case of occupation.9
C. The Mqjority Judgment
In view of the arguments presented by both Parties, the Court recognised
that the determination of 'occupation' hinges on the understanding of authority
as referred to in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907. It observed by the
majority that in order to reach a conclusion as to whether a State, whose military
forces are present on the territory of another State as a result of an intervention,
is an 'Occupying Power' in the meaning of the term as understood in international
humanitarian law, the Court must examine the sufficiency of the evidence which
can prove that "the said authority was in fact established and exercised by the
intervening State in the areas in question [emphasis added]"." The armed forces
should not just be stationed in the territory but should also have substituted their
authority for that of the local government.' The territorial limits of military
occupation cannot be ascertained by merely joining the points where armed forces
were present on a map, as was sought to be done by the DRC."2 On facts, the Court
acknowledged that there was occupation of the Ituri province but held that there
was no evidence to show that the UPDF were in occupation of any other area.

Though there were areas outside the Ituri province which were administered by
Congolese rebel movements, the evidence to show that these groups were under
the control of Uganda was lacking. Although the Court found evidence of
administrative control of Kisangani airport, outside the province of Ituri, this
6

F. DE MULINEN,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR ARMED

FoRCEs 176 (1987) [hereinafter

MuuINEN].
'7

s
'9D

Thurer, supra note 9.

G. ScHWARZENBEROER,
E MULINEN,

A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (2000).

supra note 16.

DRC v. Uganda, supra note ii.
DRC v. Uganda, supra note ii.

DRC v. Uganda, supra note ii.
113

DE

Vol. 19(1)

Student Bar Review

2oo7

was not enough to show that there was actual authority over the area and hence,
there could be no belligerent occupation. However, the Court held Uganda liable
for breach of its obligations under the law of occupation in the occupied territory
of Ituri. The fact that there was a de facto governor of the Ituri. province from the
UPDF also affected the decision of the majority. It is thus clear that the implied
rationale of the Court was that occupation exists only when a foreign military
force is in day-to-day control of local administration. Mere control of key access
points or nerve centres is not sufficient to show such control. The International
Court of Justice seems to have thus approved the stricter approach to the
interpretation of 'actual authority' in the concept of occupation.23 At first glance,
it is hard to find fault with the ruling as it is patently in conformity with the general
long standing conceptualisation of 'occupation'.
However, there are those who believe that this approach is not strict enough.
A stronger opinion expressed separately by Judge Parra-Aranguren was that the
court should also have taken into account the degree to which nominal Ugandan
administrative control was hampered by geographical characteristics of the
territory and the acts of the rebel militia as a precondition of occupation is that
legally constituted authority should actually pass into the hands of the occupant.2
He argues that the facts that a member of the UPDF was officially appointed as
governor of Kibal-Ituri and the UPDF were in control of the capital of the province
do not necessarily imply that the UPDF was in a position to exercise, and in fact
did exercise, actual authority over the entire territory of the province2
While admitting that the geographical features of the territory should be
considered when attempting to measure actual authority, it appears that Judge
Parra Aranguren has overlooked the exact wording of Article 42 of the Hague
Regulations of 107 which makes armed resistance irrelevant to the actual existence
of the situation of occupation. Further, a State intruding in the territory of another
rarely establishes complete administrative machinery with the degree of direct
control one would expect in its domestic governance. 'Actual control' should be
deemed equivalent to effective control and this is best instituted by maintaining
control over pivotal centres which allow exercise of that control over a wide area
with minimum expenditure of resources.26 In that light, Judge Parra-Aranguren's
23

M. E. McGuiness, Case ConcerningArmedActivities on the Territory of the Congo: The
1CJ Finds Uganda Acted Unlawfully and Orders Reparations, available at http://

www.asi.org/insights/2oo6/oi/insightso6olog.html (last visited 30th April
2007).
24

25
26

Separate Opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren, DRC v. Uganda, supra note ii.
Id.
That a military government may allow segments of the local government to
continue operating, subject to some amount of supervision, for administrative
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test would fail in the face of military strategy and most situations of armed control
would fail to meet the a strict criterion of occupation. As humanitarian law seeks
to alleviate the sufferings of war for the protected population of the occupied
territory, restricting the scope of its application will certainly not serve its purpose.
D. The Separate Opinion of Judge Koojimans: Rejecting Traditional
'Occupation'
Judge Koojimans argued for a more liberal approach to the understanding
of occupation where the actual authority should be measured by the degree it
prevents other governments from exercising control 27By this definition, control
over nerve centres could amount to occupation, if there is no other entity
exercising authority over the area due to the blocking of such important locations.
He recognises, unlike Judge Parra-Aranguren, that at the time of the drafting of
the Hague Regulations, the term occupation had not yet acquired its present day
pejorative connections and hence it was assumed that the occupant would
establish its authority through some kind of direct and easily identifiable
administration.,2 However, today it suits the purpose of the occupant to refrain
from establishing its own administrative system while exercising authority through
intermediaries and surrogates such as transitional governments and rebel
movements.29 Accordingly, he takes exception to the requirement imposed by
the majority for the intervening State to have substituted its authority for that of
the territorial power as an unwarranted narrowing of the criterion) 0 In his
opinion, the more appropriate legal formulation would be that the territorial
government should cease to exercise authority and the invading State alone should
be in a position to maintain order in the territory?' Applied to the facts of the
case, "by occupying the nerve centres of governmental authority - which in the
specific geographical circumstances were the airports and military bases the UPDF
effectively barred the DRC from exercising its authority over the territories
concerned"Y The decisive factor was the elimination of the authority of the DRC
government. With regard to Judge Parra-Aranguren's opinion, Judge Koojimans
considered it irrelevant that certain areas were under the control of rebel
movements as such a situation was aided by Uganda's invasion. In effect, he said
convenience and a strong preference for allowing local authorities to perform
governmental functions has been seen in the history of occupation. M. N. ScuMIrr,
The Law of Belligerent Occupation, available at http://www.hrw.org (last visited

28

30th April 2007).
DRC v. Uganda, supra note 11.
Separate Opinicn of Judge Koojimans, DRC v. Uganda, supra note ii.

29

Id.

30

Id.

3'

Id.

27

32 Id.
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that "it is irrelevantfrom a legal point of view whether [the occupant] exercised
this authority directly or left much of it to local forces or local authorities.As
long as it effectively occupied the locations which the DRC Government would
have needed to re-establish its authority, Uganda had effective, and thus factual,
authority. Its argument that it cannot be considered an effective occupying
power, in view of the limited number of its troops, cannot therefore, be upheld".
This formulation appears sufficiently flexible to deal with non-traditional
forms of military occupation. The principle enunciated by the International Court
of Justice is doubtless in accordance with the traditional notion of occupation but
where the concept itself demands rethinking, it may fall short in delivering justice
to the invaded population. Judge Koojimans' dissent then becomes important in
indicating the path along which the law should ideally progress. Detractors of the
opinion may complain that the proposition is too broad and would culminate in
characterising any armed presence as occupation. However, one must note that
it was only with regard to the specific geographical circumstances that Judge
Koojimans concluded that control of airfields and other strategic locations
amounted to preventing the invaded government from exercising control. In
other situations not supported by similar conditions, it could require widespread
control of administrative bodies on a daily and consistent basis to achieve the
same result. Therefore, this interpretation is not actually as broad as it may appear
at first sight and is quite capable of being applied as a general legal rule for the
extent of authority 'occupation' will necessitate in humanitarian law.
The ramifications of Judge Koojimans' liberal delimitation of the boundaries
of 'actual authority' in occupation can be understood if applied, in contradiction
to the majority judgment of the International Court of Justice, to the scenario in
the Gaza Strip after Israel's withdrawal in 2005. Although hailed as the end of
Israeli occupation in the area by some, others still allege that it is under effective
occupation as Israel controls its airspace and sea access. Since direct military
control has ceased, applying the majority decision of the ICJ will imply that there
is no Israeli occupation.
It is feared that the removal of troops and settlers will not end the occupation
for the purpose of international humanitarian law as long as Israel retains
significant control over the Gaza Strip which enables it to exercise 'key elements'
of authority.3 The geographical location of the Strip is such that Israel lies between
the other Palestinian territory, the West Bank. Gaza is a coastal region and its land
borders are surrounded by wire barriers erected by Israel. Consequently,
33

A. Ahmed, The Withdrawal Hoax in Gaza, (Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://
(last
www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2218/stories/2oo5o9ogoos3128oo.htm
visited 3oth April 2007).
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interaction with other Palestinian territories is restricted and regulated by Israel.
The Strip also shares a small border with Egypt which the Israel.military continues
to monitor by means of a checkpoint at Kerem Shalom where the Strip meets
Egypt and Israel. Gaza was allowed three miles of territorial waters after which
Israeli waters begin. Gaza will also require Israeli permission to build air or sea
port facilities?' If these access points are seen as the nerve centres of authority'
and essential for the Palestinian state to exercise its authority, application of
Judge Koojimans' formula would lend legal support to this argument.
Clearly, by failing to reach a unanimous decision as to the interpretation of
occupation in international humanitarian law, the International Court of Justice
has added to the prevailing confusion surrounding the concept. Adherence to the
majority decision, while simplifying matters, may not be uniformly acceptable in
practice, especially in the face of such a convincing dissent. This problem is
obvious in the scenario discussed above. It may have been possible for the majority
to use the same rule, yet differ from Judge Koojimans' findings on the Ugandan
occupation by considering that the evidence did not indicate that control of the
nerve centres completely disallowed exercise of authority by any other entity.
Unfortunately, the International Court of Justice chose to follow the more
stringent approach which would lay a greater number of situations open to dispute
as methods of aggression and exercising control change.

II.

CONcLUSION

As methods and tactics of aggression and warfare evolve, our understanding
of belligerent occupation will require urgent reconsideration. In order to achieve
the aims of international humanitarian law, it would become crucial to judge the
state of occupation by facts on the ground. The opinion of the International Court
of Justice would have greatly contributed in the creation of a set of legal criteria
against which such facts should be measured. The majority decision does attempt
to do so yet ultimately adopts an excessively legalistic approach. Since the law of
occupation is primarily concerned with the protection of non-combatants and
the population of the occupied territory, this definition serves the purpose of IHL
only to a very limited extent. Judge Koojimans' dissent is convincing enough to
merit another look at the issue. Although the decision of the ICJ is noteworthy for
having contemplated the issue for the first time, it has not succeeded in clarifying
the concept but has made further discussion of the concept very necessary.
34

Id.
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